# 1AC

Contention One is Instrumentalization of Cubana

The Resolution poses the question of economic engagement, to engage or not to engage, however, we fail to ask ourselves what engagement means, what it entails, and what interests it has served in the past.

Specifically, in Cuban engagement policy, the United States framed its engagement policies around the belief that cuba is a rationalized and controllable entity, this pre-supposes a universal set of western foreign policy goals that rely on a managerial enframing of the world.

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(Calum, PhD candidate in International Relations @ McMaster University, *Canadian Foreign Policy Journal*, Vol. 16, No. 1, “To engage or not to engage: An (a)ffective argument in favour of a policy of engagement with Cuba”)

The purpose here is not simply to illustrate positive or negative functionality, however, but to stress the degree to which **emotional commitments are implicated in American** and Canadian **foreign policy toward Cuba—and** how **this process fails to acknowledge, but is a product of, the way power, emotion and context shape subjectivity in differing contexts**. As Voss & Dorsey (1992: 23) stress, actor’s perceptions can be influenced by historical and cultural factors of which the actor may not even be aware. A basic premise of the hot cognition approach is that **all political stimuli are affectively charged**. **This means that perception, interpretation and reaction are both cognitive and affective; thought devoid of emotional content is also devoid of meaning—it is an abstraction and consequently cannot compel us to act consistently in one way or another. It is not surprising, then, that certain emotionally laden normative commitments would inform** both Canadian and **American foreign policy. It is also not surprising they would not be acknowledged as reflective of a pervasive ideology, but rather as the natural order of things—so natural that they become subconscious and unquestioned**,5 **and are deployed in ways which uncritically presuppose their universality**. **The geopolitical context has changed radically since 1989**. The collapse of Soviet communism opened up policymaking possibilities while creating new problems, some unforeseen. For Cuba, the end of the Cold War was an unmitigated disaster. Protected by its strategic and economic relationship with the Soviet Union6 from the full effect of the US economic embargo since the 1960s, **Cuban policymakers suddenly found themselves exposed to the unfiltered force of US hostility**. With its economy imploding,7 Cuba sought alternative sources for economic and political support. Domestically, Cuba instituted the Special Period in Time of Peace, and began to alter the structure of its economy to correspond to new realities. The key impetus in Cuban foreign policy became strategic diversification, wherein Cuban policymakers sought to maximize their decision-making options by avoiding over-dependence on a single bilateral relationship with a more powerful state (Erisman, & Kirk, 1991: 2-4; Entwistle, 2009: 292-293). It was partly in relation to this changed context that both **American** and Canadian **policies toward Cuba during the 1990s were reformulated**. Canadian policy has traditionally treated Cuba like any other state in Latin America. What makes the policy interesting is the consistency with which it has been adhered to, given the American hostility to the Castro-led government. During the 1990s, the Chrétien liberals sought to re-engage with Cuba just as American policy veered toward strengthening its embargo. In this context, empathetic dialogue and a renewed Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) presence, combined with public and private criticism of Cuban human rights violations, were understood as politically and symbolically advantageous (Sagebien, 1997: 67). The essence of the approach was balance. As Robert Wright (2009: 197) argues: “[Chrétien] ... calculated that a pragmatic re-engagement with Cuba along lines similar to Pierre Trudeau’s policy would carry limited political liability if it was paired with a strong, explicit Canadian objection to Cuban human rights abuses.” In this way Canadian officials believed that Canada could demonstrate its autonomy internationally, while influencing Cuba to liberalize its economy and democratize its political system (Wylie, 2009: 16). This dovetailed nicely with Cuba’s desire to diversify its foreign relationships, and the necessity Havana faced in replacing lost Soviet/Comecon trade and investment. Canadian policy toward Cuba since the Revolution has functioned as a means of asserting Canadian autonomy vis-à-vis the United States (Molinaro, 2009; Entwistle, 2009). From the Canadian perspective, relations with Cuba necessarily and unavoidably reflect the policy decisions undertaken in Washington. Yet the nature of Canadian policy is also idiosyncratic in that it reflects the domestic culture and context within which policymaking takes place. This concern is evident from a reading of the parliamentary debates regarding the question of Cuba throughout the 1990s. As Christine Stewart, the then Secretary of State (Latin America and Africa) noted in response to the proposed Helms-Burton legislation that was making its way through Congress: We hope there will be amendments to this legislation before it is pursued in the United States. However, we have made it very clear that Canada will be pursuing and will continue to pursue an independent foreign policy. This is very well respected world wide. (Canada, 1995a. Italics added for emphasis). The emphasis on policy autonomy is marked, as well as the assumption of its importance to Canada’s image abroad. What it reveals is a parochial tendency to conflate an inflated fear of infringement upon Canadian autonomy, with a parochial understanding of Canadian values and their universal applicability—generally in juxtaposition with the United States.8 Here we see a tendency to assume that others see Canada as Canada would like to see itself. It is interesting in this regard to consider Christine Stewart’s conflation of self-interest with an ostensibly altruistic foreign policy to Latin America. She argues: I believe that Canada should continue to support regional initiatives in favour of human rights, environmental protection and trade development ... in this process, we should also make sure that poor countries are not marginalized. Marginalization of less developed countries can result in instability and massive movements of populations away from poor countries and into rich ones, and could also jeopardize emerging economies. Such situations have repercussions all over the world ... Cuba poses another challenge. The Cuban economy has undergone serious deterioration. Economic reforms have been limited as have human rights improvements. However I believe we cannot afford to marginalize any country in this hemisphere. Careful evaluation is necessary to encourage the full reintegration of Cuba into the hemispheric family, a process that will require significant change (Canada, 1995b. Italics added for emphasis). The perceived threat noted in failing to engage the developing world—of which Cuba is a part—is combined with an assumption concerning the terms of reintegration, terms which require careful evaluation by Canada if full reintegration is to be achieved. The objectification of Cuba, and the privileging of the Canadian subject position are quite stark in this example; the terms of reintegration are to be determined by careful Canadian evaluation as a means—ironically—of circumventing their marginalization. That this has led to a position of some hypocrisy is highlighted by Peter McKenna and John Kirk when they note that:... Cuban authorities also know that the Canadian government does not do Washington’s bidding and that it does not intend to do anything to destabilize the Castro regime or to punish the Cuban people; instead, it aims to work constructively by dialoguing with the Cubans (2005: 159). There is a logic in the fear Ottawa has of destabilizing the Cuban government, insofar as it might also destabilize the region; a dialogue-based incremental approach would seem to have the advantage of mitigating this outcome—yet this logic still fails to acknowledge how unreceptive Cuban policy makers are to encroachments into their domestic politics, regardless of the form they take (Klepak, 2009: 33-34; Entwistle, 2009: 292). Given the implicit commitment to regime change inherent in the constructive engagement policy, it is difficult to see how Canadian policy can be understood as not having the effect of destabilizing the Cuban government; what has been characteristic of Canadian constructive engagement is not dialogue but monologue—a policy characterized by an implicit and uncritical assumption that the terms of the discussion should be shaped by the normative commitments underpinning the constructive component of the engagement policy. This dynamic is perhaps nowhere better evidenced than in the Chrétien visit to Cuba in April 1998. The high profile visit came in the wake of the 1997 fourteen-point Joint Declaration, fostering state-to-state cooperation in areas including human rights and standards of good governance (Wylie 2009: 48). The Declaration seemed to validate the constructive engagement approach of the Chrétien Liberals insofar as it included measures aimed at strengthening bilateral ties—including a willingness to discuss human rights.9 The visit itself was therefore undertaken as a high profile and symbolic means to demonstrate the efficacy of engaging in this way with Cuba so as to secure both economic and political/human rights gains. It would also serve as a means to position Canada in relation to Cuba “on the right side of history” (Wright 2009: 217). The decisive moment of the visit occurred when Chrétien publicly humiliated Castro by confronting him with a demand to release four jailed Cuban dissidents (Wright 2009: 210). Humiliated and shocked though he may have been, the move failed in its desired effect and the dissidents were not released. The visit, argues Mark Entwistle, accomplished “practically nothing” (2009: 289). In the fall of 1999, then International Trade Minister Pierre Pettigrew still maintained that constructively engaging could achieve the ends sought (and assumed inevitable) by Canadian policymakers. He argued, “The best way to help [Cuba] to [implement reforms] ... is to engage them and integrate them into world markets” (quoted in Kirk & McKenna, 2005: 155). What this also seems to indicate is that the perception of policymakers in Ottawa is affectively shaped by the context in which they are situated. Regardless of their dispositions, a key attribute of all policy makers is loyalty to the state—that is, a performed (emotional) commitment to serving the national interest. This necessarily inclines policy to be informed in the first instance by the perceived material interests of the state (i.e., preserving autonomy, and securing new markets for Canadian business), and in a broader sense by the perceived values and their associated norms which define Canadian-ness at home, and it is assumed, abroad. Lana Wylie (2004: 42) argues that “... the Canadian self-image as a good international citizen, peacekeeper, and as distinct from the United States, all contribute to a certain perception of the Cuban situation, and the Canadian-Cuban relationship, and consequently to a corresponding set of norms.” Although these norms help us to explain some of the character of the relationship, they do little to explain how these ideas become entrenched and gain legitimacy and how they possibly morph over time. What they also point to, when taken in conjunction with an understanding of the relationship between emotion, reason, and socio-cultural context, is that a culturally informed normative parochialism is perhaps a pre-condition of the necessary affective dynamics inherent in the relationship between individuals and the state. That this dynamic has been self-defeating in the Cuban context requires a consideration of how power, emotion and culture can act in the Cuban context to preclude the inevitability of regime change. Before we can consider this, it is important to consider the above dynamics from the American perspective. The two most contentious pieces of legislation pertaining to Cuba are embodied in the 1992 CUBAN DEMOCRACY ACT and the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996. The CUBAN DEMOCRACY ACT, in some ways, reflects the systemic and domestic contexts of the early 1990s. **With the Cold War over and the Soviet bloc transitioning to market-based economies and representative democratic political systems, it was assumed that Cuba—deprived of Soviet subsidies and hopelessly isolated—would eventually follow suit**. As the CUBAN DEMOCRACY ACT notes: The fall of communism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the now universal recognition in Latin America and the Caribbean that Cuba provides a failed model of government and development, and the evident inability of Cuba's economy to survive current trends, provide the United States and the international democratic community with an unprecedented opportunity to promote a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba (CUBAN DEMOCRACY ACT, 1992: §6001(6)). Thus, **it seemed the revolutionary Cuban government would be unable to withstand the tide of history, and would eventually be swept aside in the inevitable march toward a relatively uniform global political economy broadly consistent with the norms prevalent in Western capitalist democracies.** Domestically, the key factors engendering an inclination toward adopting the CUBAN DEMOCRACY ACT were the influences of the Cuban-American National Foundation (CANF) and the political manoeuvring of both candidates vying for the 1992 US presidential election.10 The Act itself attempts to strengthen the economic pressures brought to bear on the Cuban state (known as Track I), with attempts to increase bilateral relationships at the non-governmental level (known as Track II). The Track I CUBAN DEMOCRACY ACT legislation affected Canada and other states trading with Cuba by preventing subsidiaries of American corporations from trading with Cuba, and by preventing foreign ships docking in Cuban ports from unloading or loading cargo in US ports for six months (CUBAN DEMOCRACY ACT, 1992: Sec. 6005). This extra-territorial component to the CUBAN DEMOCRACY ACT angered US trading partners by challenging the primacy of both domestic law and policy autonomy in those countries (Morley \*& McGillion, 2002: 45). The Track I components of the Act were meant to hasten the demise of the current government and to bring about a quick transition to the US government’s preferred form of political system for the island. The CUBAN DEMOCRACY ACT is quite clear in this regard; stating that the President may waive the sanctions and take steps toward ending the embargo if he determines that the Cuban state has met the standards for democratic transition set forth in the Act. Amongst these include the holding of “free and fair elections under internationally recognized observers ... [and movement] toward establishing a free market economic system” (CUBAN DEMOCRACY ACT, 1992: § 6006). Track II diplomacy, by way of contrast, involves the “unofficial interactions between people from countries or groups in conflict for the purpose of promoting peaceful solutions to international disagreements” (Blight & Brenner, 2002: 170). **Although the CUBAN DEMOCRACY ACT’s provisions for increased interpersonal interaction between Americans and Cubans are framed in humanitarian terms**, **these** Track II **provisions also embody a belief in the potential for people-to-people contacts to develop a Cuban civil society capable of challenging and ultimately overturning the Cuban government** (CUBAN DEMOCRACY ACT, 1992: § 6004g). William LeoGrande (2005: 37) points to this element of the CUBAN DEMOCRACY ACT when he argues “**from the outset, Washington conceived of these contacts as a way to subvert the Cuban government. That was how the policy was promoted** when first introduced by Congressman Robert Torricelli, author of the CUBAN DEMOCRACY ACT”. **It is the transparent political intent of this legislation that makes it ultimately self- defeating.** The Cuban government was well aware of the purpose of Track II—and cracked down on dissidents accordingly. More interesting still, LeoGrande points to one unanticipated outcome of President Clinton’s decision to allow travel to Cuba for religious, humanitarian and people-to-people contacts: the emergence of a constituency in the United States advocating a change in the hard-line US policy (2005: 27). It is the uncritical presumption that the Cuban government would not recognize the threat constituted by the CUBAN DEMOCRACY ACT’s Track II provisions and that these interactions would necessarily hasten the demise of the Cuban government that are so problematic and self-defeating. Helms-Burton represented a further tightening of the economic noose—this time with a more explicit commitment to the character and content of a future non-Castro Cuba. This particular piece of legislation was passed into law four years after the CUBAN DEMOCRACY ACT, and strengthens the extra-territorial implications of the CUBAN DEMOCRACY ACT so as to increase the risks involved for foreign corporations that seek to conduct business with Cuba and the United States. In particular, Title III of the Act provides a means through which American citizens can sue investors in property found to be expropriated by the Cuban government after the Revolution, and Title IV of the Act allows Washington to ban business people and their families from entering the United States if they are found to be trafficking in expropriated property (Helms-Burton Act 1996: Title III, § 302; Title IV, § 401). In addition, Helms-Burton specifically excludes either of the Castro brothers from any role in the transition process or a future non-revolutionary government, and provides the President with the right to determine whether or not a transition is actually taking place (Helms-Burton 1996: Title II, § 205-207). Although Title III was, and has continued to be, suspended every six months, it is still in effect—as is Title IV. Both Title III and IV outraged Canadian, Mexican and European policymakers as blatant attempts to impose US law extra-territorially. Robert G. Wright, then Canadian Deputy Minister for International Trade, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade stated the Canadian position in regard to Helms-Burton succinctly: The Interamerican Juridical Committee ... found the legislation to be inconsistent with international law in a number of different respects. Key among these were the following: First, domestic courts are not the appropriate forum for resolution of state-to-state claims; second, the committee found that a claimant state, in this instance the United States, does not have the right to espouse claims of persons who were not their nationals at the time of the taking; and third, the committee found that the exercise of jurisdiction by a state over acts of trafficking by aliens abroad under circumstances whereby neither the alien nor the conduct in question has any connection with its territory is not in conformity with international law (Canada, 1996). However, the Deputy Minister continues that: ... Canada and the United States share common objectives with respect to Cuba. Both countries would like to see steps taken toward democracy, economic reform, and a greater recognition of human rights. We differ in the approach. The United States has adopted a policy of isolation; Canada, on the other hand, believes in a policy of engagement (Canada, 1996). The thrust of the Canadian position is that Helms-Burton violates Canadian autonomy, and is in this specific way against Canada’s national interest. The need for Canada to be perceived as distinct from the United States is also evident in above quotations; a display of Canadian autonomy has been a primary impetus to Canadian Cuba policy since the Revolution (Wylie, 2009: 62). Moreover, the Canadian position in relation to Cuba differs from the United States primarily as a preference of process to the same end: democracy and market-oriented economic reform. It is interesting that, even as the Canadian position demands respect for its own sovereignty, it also advocates a foreign policy toward Cuba predicated upon interference in that state’s domestic affairs. The passage of the Act was far from smooth, as the US public, exporters and many policymakers were also concerned with what seemed extreme and potentially self-defeating legislation (Gott, 2004: 303-307). It is indeed unlikely that Helms-Burton would ever have been enacted into law had it not been for the shooting down of two aircraft operated by the anti-Castro group, Brothers to the Rescue. As Lana Wylie (2004: 46) stresses: Prior to the shooting down, the only pressure to sign Helms-Burton was coming from the Cuban American community. Despite their electoral clout, Clinton had opposed the bill. However, like their policymakers, the American public reacted viscerally to the shoot-down. Emotions were running high and Clinton’s advisors felt they had no choice but to get behind the legislation. This response seems understandable, until one considers the situation from the Cuban perspective. Jose Basulto, the founder of the Brothers to the Rescue, was initially a CIA- trained operative as a part of Operation Mongoose during the 1960s (Blight and Brenner, 2002: 165). In August of 1962, Basulto had been involved in a botched attempt on Castro’s life and in the 1980s worked again for the CIA in Nicaragua. Brothers to the Rescue was founded as a means to facilitate the rescue of Cubans seeking to leave Cuba during the Special Period. Yet this humanitarian initiative became increasingly politicized as Clinton moved closer to normalizing relations with Cuba. As a result, Basulto began dropping leaflets regularly over Havana to encourage the Cubans to rise up against their government (Blight & Brenner, 2002: 167). Given this history, and despite repeated protests to the United States government by Cuba, nothing was done to stop this provocation. Although it is unclear whether the aircrafts were over Cuban airspace when they were shot down, the Cuban reaction, although severe, was at least somewhat more understandable, given the broader context. The affective quality of the response to the shoot-down fits snugly within the broader assumptions about the character of the Cuban state, and Castro in particular, as framed by his detractors. **The embargo itself facilitated the entrenchment of a particular vision of Cuba to the American public by limiting their contact with the island, and magnifying their reliance upon highly politicized groups**, like the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF), and right wing neoconservative politicians, like Jesse Helms, for information. **This lack of empathy was still in evidence after the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Even when the Cuban state denounced terrorism and expressed sympathy toward the United States after the attacks, the United States government did not respond in kind. Instead the Bush administration increased its rhetoric against the Cuban government and continued to label it a terrorist-supporting nation** (LeoGrande, 2005: 32).

**What the above analysis points to is the degree to which emotion and context have shaped the rather problematic relations between** Canada, **the United States and Cuba**. If, however, we find problematic the notion that the current political system in Cuba has little legitimacy domestically, and no hope for survival in the medium term, we must address the question of why this is so. Robert Damasio argues that for the somatic marking process to function, a capacity to order criteria relevant to the stimuli encountered by the subject is required. This ordering criterion is determined via a combination of emotion, working memory and attention, which are reflective of biological drives and cultural socialization. In a sense, **every decision we make is influenced by a combination of logic** (one would hope) **and affectively charged analogical reasoning.** Worded concisely, **somatic markers act as a kind of heuristic psychological culling device functionally integrated into our decision-making process; its use facilitates more efficient decision-making in cognitively complex scenarios by a priori eliminating the appeal of certain courses of action**. **The process of somatic marking** outlined here, therefore, **seems particularly apt to a foreign policy-making context**. **This is so, given the cognitive complexity of foreign policy decision-making, wherein policy-makers must contend with not only the likely actions and outcomes beyond the state in the relevant issue area, but also the domestic, bureaucratic, and even dispositional constraints placed on the array of choices available to them**. **Negative somatic markers juxtaposed alongside specific future outcomes—say the elimination of an embargo—can alert the individual against that particular course of action; conversely, positive somatic markers can act as a “beacon of incentive” influencing the subjects’ decision-making toward that particular outcome** (Damasio, 1994: 174-175). This process of somatic marking functions both consciously and subconsciously, influencing those elements in the brain which incline us to approach behaviour, and mitigating the likelihood of making what we are culturally inclined to believe is a wrong decision (Damasio, 1994: 188). We have already seen the doggedness with which Canadian policy makers have clung to the belief that constructive engagement can result in political and economic change in Cuba, despite much evidence to the contrary. Similarly, **the tone and tenor of US relations with Cuba have been characterized by a profound lack of empathy—a characteristic which, when combined with the tremendous material power of the American state, could aptly be termed pathological parochialism**. Canada has at least adopted an approach which goes further in acknowledging the legitimacy of the Cuban government—yet even its policies show a self- defeating desire to combine an ardent commitment to pursuing the national interest (with a marked affective commitment to policy autonomy relative to its southern neighbour) with a normative commitment to engendering the re-construction of the Cuban political economy in ways which correspond more closely to its own. Given that both states have expressed a commitment11 in principle (if not always in practise) to regime change, and given that this change is uncritically expected to result in a Cuban political system mirroring the basic principles that their own systems embrace, it seems logical for both state’s policies to be geared toward achieving this end as effectively as possible. Yet **neither embargo nor constructive engagement seems capable of achieving the end of transforming the Cuban political system**. It is my contention that, **in the case of American** and Canadian **relations with Cuba, the state is singularly ill equipped to foster the kind of empathy required to bring about the ends it seeks. It may be that the most effective means to win the battle for hearts and minds in Cuba—if indeed such a battle can be won—is to extricate the state from the interactive process. If it is true that liberal democratic capitalism**, to paraphrase Fukuyama, **is the “only game in town”, then allowing** Canadians and **Americans—and their attendant dispositions—to engage Cubans in unstructured (and therefore relatively de-politicized) ways should have the desired and inevitable effect**. Of course, an underlying premise of this paper is that neuroscience and neuropsychology has rendered problematic any universal assumptions about rationality. In particular, Robert Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis indicates that **the relationship between emotion, reason, and the process of social learning, facilitated by interpersonal interaction, problematizes universal rationality assumptions**. As a consequence we cannot a priori assume the outcome of an engagement policy between Canada or **the United States and Cuba**. As Damasio (1994: 200) argues: The automated somatic-marker device of most of us lucky enough to have been reared in a relatively healthy culture has been accommodated by education to the standards of rationality of that culture. In spite of its roots in biological regulation, the device has been tuned to cultural prescriptions designed to ensure survival in a particular society ... [the device] has been made rational relative to social conventions and ethics. Thus **an inadvertent effect of the US embargo has been to forestall the sharing of lived experiences between Americans and Cubans; the embargo has skewed the acquisition of somatic marking**, and both magnified the degree to which Cuban policy elites fear and mistrust US initiatives toward their country, and facilitated the ability of both states to frame the significant other in a negative fashion for public consumption. Given the triangulated nature of Canadian foreign policy toward Cuba, this entrenched fear and mistrust between Cuba and the United States has played a major role in shaping Canadian policy. Cuba has gained significance in Canadian policy because it has become a sovereignty issue for Canadians in that it allows Ottawa to demonstrate Canadian autonomy (as ever, in juxtaposition with the United States), while allowing Canadians to gain emotional satisfaction in perceiving themselves as good international citizens and mediators (Wylie, 2009: 55-57). Yet the above still begs the question of how exactly state power, ideology and emotion coalesce in particularistic ways. Stephen Wilkinson (2008a: 12) echoes Wright’s observation that **western liberals and conservatives alike view the Cuban government as undemocratic, and capable of maintaining power only via the restriction of the freedom to associate and by controlling the media**. He also notes that **the effect of assuming that Cuba will inevitably transition to western modes of governance is to engender an ideologically skewed debate in which an adequate resolution to the question of why the Cuban government has survived the shocks of the post-Cold War period remains unanswered**. Wilkinson chooses to draw upon the work of Michel Foucault as a means to understand how power and ideology function in modern welfare states to influence the allegiance and behaviour of mass publics. He argues: **While this may involve the use of repression and imply consent, power is neither of these two in itself. In the exercise of power, therefore, ideology has a paramount role, because it enables persuasion by argument, seduction and moral exhortation**. In the spectrum of actions that the powerful can exert in order to affect the behaviour of the subjects of their power, the threat of violence and violence itself are last resorts. Again, Foucault’s argument would suggest that by not having to use the “last resort” something else must be compelling mass behaviour in Cuba (2008a: 13). Pastoral power in its modern form has as its basic unit state officials, which have grown in number in proportion to the development of the modern welfare state, and gather, as part of their occupational requirements, enormous amounts of information about the intimate lives of the population (Wilkinson, 2008a: 18).12 The ideological themes of saving the nation, saving the species, and self-sacrifice can be understood to be entrenched in the Cuban public consciousness via this process of pastoral power combined with the affective/cognitive psychological processes observed and tested by Damasio. **Emotion is given meaning socially** (Fattah and Fierke, 2009: 69-71); **it is performative in essence and, when combined with the power in this way, can compel and entrench particular readings of history, legitimating a particular process of “othering”, and with that, reasoning and policy**.13 Indeed, one can see how the moral obligation to publicly display allegiance to the Revolution, combined with less structured forms of interpersonal interaction (via family etc.), can influence the affective commitments of Cubans in ways quite distinct from those of Canadians and Americans. As Wilkinson notes, “What this structure [of power] implies is that the individual is morally compelled to conform by participating because consequences for visibly not doing so will quickly lead to stigmatisation and possible social exclusion” (2008: 19).14 More interesting still, by combining an emphasis upon the historical antecedents of the ideology legitimating the rule of the Cuban state with the socialization engendered via the dynamics inherent in the manifestation of pastoral power, Wilkinson’s analysis can be read as a situational outline of how the process of somatic marking occurs in Cuba. It also goes some way to illustrate how **socio-cultural context is both shaped by** (dispositionally) **and shapes** (situationally) **the emotional lives of those who live within it. That the above observation applies equally well to** Canada and **the United States should be readily apparent, particularly given the combination of increased surveillance, paranoia, and racial profiling characteristic of the US government’s response to the terrorist attacks of 9-11** (Blight & Brenner, 2002: 185-186). As we have seen, **this fact can be understood to confer tremendous legitimacy upon the Castro government in the eyes of the Cuban people and should be taken into account when considering the Cuban state’s actions or its ability to endure crises** (Blight & Brenner, 2002: 188-191). That Cuban rationality has particular qualities is evident in Cuba’s adamant refusal to compromise its sovereignty during the 1962 missile crisis, wherein Castro seemed willing to risk nuclear annihilation rather than compromise with the United States. James Blight and Philip Brenner (2002: 188) argue in relation to the Cuban response to the missile crisis that: ... Cubans seem almost to be from some other planet. Their attitudes and behaviour seem to make no sense, because as the superpowers tried desperately to defuse the crisis, the Cubans resented the very idea of a resolution to the crisis on the terms agreed to in Moscow and Washington. More, they did what they could to prolong the crisis and seemed unworried about increasing the risk of a war that might have destroyed human civilization. They continue that this all-or-nothing perspective in relation to Cuban sovereignty is still evident today—and, one might add, it still offers a puzzle that is unlikely to be adequately understood without a consideration of the role of emotion in rationality. This dynamic has certainly been witnessed in Canada-Cuban relations as evidenced by the problematic Chrétien visit in 1998.15 Although the above gives an indication of the possible ways in which emotion, culture and power can shape rationality and behaviour, it should not be read as overly deterministic. To be sure, there are avenues available for Americans, Canadians, and to a lesser extent for Cubans, to circumvent the process of framing (internet, radio, foreign media, friends/family abroad etc...), but it is not too bold an assertion to posit the pervasive indifference and ignorance of most Americans (and Canadians, for that matter) in relation to all things Cuban—and the unlikelihood of the majority of them expending the effort to seek out sources of information beyond the state and the mainstream media. Moreover, while we might speculate on the role of Radio Martí in undermining the legitimacy of the Cuban government via a comparison with the effect of similar US programs in the former Soviet bloc, it is worth noting the aforementioned structural advantages enjoyed by the Cuban government in relation to Cuban non-elites, and the role it has played there historically. As long as the Cuban state continues to provide public goods and remains relatively free of corruption, its ability to endure should not be underestimated. **Although this paper has offered a psychological explanation in favour of a policy of engagement, it is not naïve to the possibility of such a policy** occurring **in** either state— particularly **the United States.** **Fostering empathy between states is much easier** (although not easy at all) **than fostering sympathy. The reasons for this are that policymakers are situated within an institutional context that demands their ultimate loyalty; the degree to which they can foster a policy which reflects a felt appreciation for the constraints and desires faced by their counterparts in other states will inevitably be filtered through the demands of the national interest as defined by their particular locale within the governmental apparatus**. It could be argued **from this that state institutions have their own affective qualities and that these qualities constrain and contextualize the capacity of policymakers to realize policy which embodies a degree of sympathy**. Fear, for example, is an emotion that is institutionally privileged in the parts of the state apparatus charged with defence. Damasio (1994: 246) alludes to this when he writes: **Knowing about the relevance of feelings in the process of reason does not suggest that reason is less important than feelings, that it should take a backseat to them or that it should be less cultivated ... taking stock of the pervasive role of feelings may give us a chance of enhancing their positive effects and reducing their potential harm.** Specifically, without diminishing the orienting value of normal feelings, one would want to protect reason from the weakness that abnormal feelings or the manipulation of normal feelings can introduce in the process of planning and deciding (italics added for emphasis). One can infer that **the inability of successive US administrations to eliminate the embargo is a function of deep-seated emotionally charged beliefs that the Cuban government symbolizes a flawed alternative to the American system, and that as long as the revolutionary government is in place it will preclude Cuba’s inevitable return to the liberal democratic capitalist fold. Emotion can also highlight the domestic policy influences that incline US policymakers to sustain the embargo**. As Stephen Wilkinson (2008b: 7) argues: **There seems to be an emotional element to the embargo that is often overlooked. The superpower has to be seen to be doing something to discipline this upstart in its backyard. After failing its surrogates in the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, Washington has an emotional debt to repay to the exiles. This, in turn, has given them a privileged status, which they have exploited to effect policy decisions in Washington. These emotional commitments can also be understood to explain the inconsistency with which the United States government applies the standards it judges the Cuban government’s conduct by to other nations it deems worthy of trading with**.16 **A key mode of identity for Americans is that they are exceptional, and act as a beacon of morality and justice to the rest of the world. This parochial self-conceptualization can be understood to inform the emotional reaction of many Americans to the Revolution as it frames Cuban actions as ungrateful with subsequent legitimated emotional responses**17 (Wylie, 2009: 33-34). This deep-seated belief in the superiority of American values is unlikely to be unseated. **A policy of engagement would have the two-fold advantage of supporting this assumption (insofar as it would radically increase the interaction between Americans and Cubans) without allowing the state to intervene and distort the process of somatic marking. In addition, given the massive asymmetry in material power, there is little risk involved to the United States to employ such a policy**—however unlikely it is that it will do so.

The formulation of politics around the instrumentalization of other actors makes extinction inevitable – the conception that we are a God outside of the political sphere fixing problems makes subjective and objective violence a necessary condition of existence

Evans & Guillaume, 2010

(Brad, Lecturer in the School of Politics and International Studies at the University of Leeds, and Laura, PhD in International Politics @ Aberystwyth University, *Theory & Event*, Vol. 13, No. 3, “Deleuze and War: Introduction”)

Gilles Deleuze’s work displays an intimate relationship with the problem of war. Beginning for instance with his highly original co-authored Treatise on Nomadology , he borrowed from an array of sources including anthropology, military strategy, the human sciences, literature, aesthetics, and history, not only to illustrate how **the ‘State itself’ has always been formed ‘in relation with an outside’**, but to expose us to **a whole plethora of competing dualisms** which **when combined constitute**d **the very of order of historical battle: nomos/polis, smooth/striated, deterritorialisation/re-territorialisation, lines of flight/lines of articulation, active/reactive, movement/strata, rhizome/aborescent, minor/major, singularity/totality, heterogeneity/homogeneity, molecular/molar, so on**. Importantly, for Deleuze, when this nomadology versus the State narrative was subsequently **coupled with** his and Felix Guattari’s concept of **the “war machine” it then at once became possible to offer an alternative reading of the history of state power which, exposing the war like origin of all modern forms of civic ordering, posed uncomfortable questions for those grounded in the peaceful sermons of conventional political orthodoxy**. **For the history of State politics becomes the continuation of war by other means. The history of state power is fractured and multiplied if we consider the ways in which military force and warrior logic operates at the level of the unfolding of social relations rather than simply from the perspective of sovereign statehood**. **Once this perspective is adopted then our entire understanding of social and spatial ordering, the role of science, the deployment of technologies for rule, the formation of power/knowledge relations, the claims to truth and justice, along with the function of aesthetics factors accordingly**. Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of **the war machine was worked out in the context of the global confrontation of the Cold War, in which hair-trigger ‘nuclear security’ produced ‘a peace still more terrifying than fascist death’, whereby the spectre of war seemed to determine the conditions for international and domestic politics**. Rather than be subject to control by the state, the war machine began to take control of the state and directly invest a particular configuration of global (in-) security. However, **the Cold War genesis of the war machine concept does not mean that it has nothing to offer a post-Cold War, post-September 11th**. Deleuze’s essay ‘Postscript on Societies of Control’ indicates the ways in which he saw the security environment changing to one of modulated control and the management of flows and circulation, rather than the strict policing of identities. **The concept of the war machine itself seems to resonate with the post-September 11th world in which the nature of threats unclear and ‘unknown unknowns’ determine military planning**. Indeed, it is arguable that Deleuze **more than any other** is the ideal philosopher for **help**ing **us make sense of today’s radically interconnected post-Clausewitzean security terrain**. Something which has certainly not been lost on some of the key centres for strategic affairs, such as the RAND Corporation and the Israeli Defence Force, who have operationalised Deleuzian principles to enhance military efficacy. With this in mind, it was our conviction that an edited volume which specifically dealt with “Deleuze and War” was long since overdue, not in order to definitively pronounce on the relationship between Deleuze and War, but precisely to gesture to the multiple lines of engagement and intersection between Deleuze’s work and contemporary problems of war, peace, security and resistance. It is our hope that this volume serves to catalyse a consideration of Deleuze in the context of war, and to open up debates and lines of enquiry that may enrich our engagement with the often dispiriting problems of militarism and security. Brad Evans and Michael Hardt discuss the extent to which **civil war is no longer understood primarily through the prism of sovereignty**. This is to say, **with the primary mode of warfare no longer taking place between states, or for that matter within states for the acquisition of state power** (as in conventional civil war), **then the once familiar location of ‘war’ in relation to ‘peaceful politics’ now becomes intensely problematic**. To put it another way, **in focusing exclusively on the relationship between sovereignty and war, we are in danger of becoming blind to the iterations of war/governance which generate the conditions of possibility for everyday politics**. Indeed, as Evans and Hardt suggest, **while Liberal forms of governance are increasingly unhindered by the muddying of the waters between ‘war’ and ‘not war’, Liberalism itself as a framework for a politics concerned with emancipation and resistance might be fatally imperilled by the generalised state of war**. **Not only does this suggest the need for a rethinking of the politics of the left, or of radical democracy, but also that this new politics should take account of the ways in which modern strategies of rule are dedicated to the differential production and organisation of bodies in ways which determine the possibilities for resistance, and make the emergence of certain forms of life complicit in the martial logic of rule**. Examples include the potentially redeemable body of the insurgent, the life-inimical body of the terrorist, and the inviolable and valuable body of the US soldier. What this means is that **one can no longer assume that war is fought according to the structures of friend/enemy, them/us. Instead, it is that the production of these categories (and the multiple sub-categories that populate them) which itself is internal to ‘war.’ In turn, this necessitates a change in the way in which we think about war, which becomes less associated with transcendent categories of power (good/evil, friend/enemy) such as are associated with a moment of sovereign decision, and more concerned with the immanent production of identities and lives: with what we might call a political economy whereby the production of life is itself the production of war**. Economy thus becomes as great a concern in the analysis of contemporary war as the transcendent principles of law and sovereignty. Hence, **whilst the ‘exceptional’ instances of transcendent sovereign domination are easy to find in the recent past—as with, for example, Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib—these**, Evans and Hardt suggest, **may not be the essence of the current paradigm of war.** **Indeed, there is a potential danger for a politics of resistance or criticism in focusing exclusively on these dramatic examples of sovereign rule. This has the potential to conceal the ‘normalised’ ways in which power operates, through the juridical policing of humanity, through the production and organisation of life, through the regulation of flow and exchange in accordance with the predicates of the economising facets of global Liberal rule. It is to these that we must turn if we are to conceive a politics of resistance adequate to the task of confronting the multifaceted dimensions of war and the martial economy**. Laura Guillaume begins the interview with James Der Derian by broaching the militarization of Deleuzian concepts. Whilst for many this tendency is problematic, as Der Derian reminds us, **the militaristic appropriation of critical thought reveals a clear genealogy of (ab)use**. While **Der Derian invokes the experiences of Derrida, Foucault and Virilio, one could have also added here Nietzsche whose malicious appropriation by the forces of fascism still leaves him somewhat tarnished**. Indeed, he argues, given the evident conceptual richness of the authors in question, is there any wonder that the military would be equally seduced? Hence, **that there remains a possibility for concepts which have the aim of “liberation and resistance” to be turned into concepts for “occupation and destruction” serves to be a healthy reminder us all that our works may further rationalise the war machine**. Against this backdrop, Der Derian attends specifically to the collapse of the meaningful distinctions which once marked out Clausewitzean war. An active agent in this has been what he terms the MIME-NET (military-industrial-media-entertainment network) which actively producing the conditions for war, conditions the theatre along complex, adaptive and networked lines. Importantly, for Der Derian, since the onset of a global state of war inscribes the war machine with a “virtuous” quality (understood in terms of technological and ethical supremacy), then to understand more fully the political implications it is necessary to have a more sophisticated analytic of the composition of global war machine. “It is all too easy, he argues, “to dump this all on Bush’s doorstep.” Liberals too have a vested interest in all this. Der Derian’s analytic of the MIME-NET points to the oxymoronic nature of virtuous war. **A war that seeks to secure its peace through technological enforcement cannot achieve anything other than the creation of new political problems. The stage is thus set ‘for endless cycles of conflict in which worst case scenarios produce the future they claim only to anticipate.’ Fulfilling the prophecies of ones own making, the war machine is therefore not only virtually endowed, but in the process of going to war it actively produces the reality of the situation**. With this preemptive rationality in mind, Guillaume poses the use of Bobbit’s strategic conflations between the human and the natural in order to make sense of this new virtual terrain. Supporting the notion that **pre-emptive action “colonises the future,”** Der Derian explains the absurd quality to all this in the sense that **our interventions even take the “evils yet to be born” to be their object.** This certainly offers some lessons to us— especially concerning what not to do. **Pre-empting evil is not only ludicrous; it has proven to be disastrous. Provoking threats simply ups the ante.** Nevertheless, there is some optimism to be gleaned, for if this century can be called Deleuzian then it will be realised in the active counter-production of heterogeneous media whose cultural outputs have the potential to change attitudes far greater than any political program which claims to hold the key to universal truth. Julian Reid’s paper addresses the function of the concept of war in Deleuze’s thought, starting with a consideration of its role in transforming representative practice, as outlined in Cinema II . Reid is troubled by Deleuze’s assumption of distinctive pre-and post-war cinema (and representative practice more broadly), and his suggestion that the Second World War brought about a schism in the way that representation functions. Whereas pre-war cinema is concerned with the representation of ‘a people’, post-war cinema arises out of the recognition of the impossibility of this task. Indeed, **not only is the representation of** the **people now impossible, it is undesirable, as it reinforces a fascist fetishization of people as being of a given identity or type**. Post-war cinema focuses on gesturing to this very impossibility, whereby **the people are always missing or ‘to come.’** **The problem here**, according to Deleuze’s own discussion of war in A Thousand Plateaus , **is the supposition that war is something extra-cultural, extra-representative, which can influence culture and representation from without. On the contrary**, Deleuze is elsewhere at pains to insist that **war is immanently cultural and aesthetic**, **and** indeed, that **we can see certain modes of culture and aesthetics as themselves constituting ‘war’ on established forms of cultural practice**. In other words, cinema itself might be a war on convention: in Deleuze and Guattari’s terms, a ‘war machine.’ This changes the stakes of the analysis. **Rather than seeing a linear progression from one form of representation to another, what is called for is the understanding that culture and representation are themselves always being taken up by a war machine, oscillating between capture by the state and escape in a line of flight. While the former may faithfully reproduce images of the people and the territory, the latter produces only the inescapable flight into incalculability where the people are always missing and the territory shattered. War is an amalgam of cultural and political affects which may swing between two poles: obedience to the state and the deterritorialisation of all the state stands for**. Reid suggests that Deleuze makes use of the figure of ‘the seer’ in modern cinema, who is engaged in an encounter with the ‘the intolerable’ and thus is always pointing to that which is outside the frame and beyond representation. However, Reid argues that the seer becomes enmeshed in cliché and is therefore bound to a particular time-frame (1945–1968) in terms of the distortion of cinematic claims to truth. More broadly, sight itself becomes thoroughly contaminated with military logic, as outlined by Paul Virilio, whereby perception, capture and domination become part of the same affective moment. Reid suggests that **rather than identify the ciphers of deterritorialisation** in postmodern cinema, **we would do better to focus on the processes of state capture and escape, through which we can access the ongoing flux present in every relation to the state**. **At these crossroads, where the macro-and micropolitical encounter each other, the people are at stake**. Brian Massumi addresses the tendencies of **contemporary war**, which were intensified though not caused by September 11th 2001. On the one hand, the post-September 11th security response **was undertaken in the name of the spectre** of the absent towers: **one remembers what one does not see**. On the other, **military action becomes increasingly conceived under the banner of ‘pre-emption’, where one acts to prevent something which has not occurred, which has not been experienced**. In this sense, a schism grows between (military) action and perception— we can no longer trust our senses. For Massumi, **this has revealing consequences for how we are to think contemporary war in relation to the politics of everyday life. Rather than thinking in terms of what we experience or perceive**, Massumi suggests that **we ought to explore what takes place in this space before perception, in which we are primed for attention, ready to perceive**, on ‘red alert.’ **This space before action, before decision, is increasingly the subject of a military ‘occupation.’ Rather than being a discreet activity which takes place in a defined location against a pre-determined set of people, war becomes generalised, ubiquitised, prior to politics**. Massumi cites **Arquilla and Ronfeldt**, who **define ‘soft power’ as ‘epistemological warfare’, because it is concerned with what people know, or what they think they know**. Massumi suggests that **soft power is now ubiquitous. No longer merely the companion to exceptional ‘hard power’ operations, ‘epistemological warfare’ has become the condition of ‘normal’ political life**. However, this is not quite right. For the **current ‘everyday war’ is concerned not so much with what we know (or think we know) as what we are (or are becoming). This is not so much epistemological as ontological war, concerned with the ongoing emergence of subjects of certain kinds primed to react and respond in certain ways to emergent dangers which are themselves in a permanent condition of emergence. This future-facing war is always in the process of conditioning corporeal emergence and determining future reactions**. Like capitalism itself, **this process is non-linear and seemingly compatible with the Liberal predicates of freedom and individualism: predicates which are incapable of interrogating the pre-individual domain of affect, and which are thereby entirely compatible with this generalised state of war (as a mode of governance) and unable to provide the platform for an effective critique (as a politics of resistance**). Consequently, Massumi says that **‘[i]t is not enough to stop one war or even many. It is not enough to vote out one government bent on war, nor many.’ Rather the task is to reclaim the space of emergence**—of the virtual—**which is in danger of being given over to a military logic of pre-emption.** John Protevi is concerned with the production of **certain ‘bodies politic’** which **constitute aspects of war**. The term ‘body politic’ is intended to draw attention to the extent that **military bodies cannot be understood exclusively through the prism of either the somatic or the social**. Rather, **they must be understood as dynamic assemblages**; as Protevi says, ‘geo-bio-techno-affective assemblages’, **which exceed capture by any one interpretative framework**. **This suggests a change in the way in which we deploy the concept of the body in making sense of affective responses to war**. **It is no longer sufficient to rely on biological accounts of why bodies perform in certain ways**. **Rather**, Protevi suggests, **we should mobilise** Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of **affect , which refers to the ability of bodies to form assemblages with other bodies**. Indeed, this is a problematic formulation in the sense that the body cannot be understood apart from this ability. It is the formation of assemblages, and the ongoing interaction that bodies have with other bodies that enables us to define ‘what a body is.’ And **this challenges the analytic approach to bodies at war which would seek to distinguish among history, biology, culture, society and so on, when in fact the connections that bodies make exceed and undermine these distinctions**. What is the key for Protevi is the way in which **we can think of war in adaptive terms, or as a selection pressure, without essentialising either what we mean by ‘war’, or what we take to be the responses and reactions of bodies. This involves rescuing from the idea of simple evolution a notion of the ‘body politic’ as a dynamic active and evolving assemblage**. Discussing the phenomenon of ‘rage’ across historical cultures, Protevi wants to rescue some notion of ‘human nature’ from the notion that all emotions and affective manifestations are socially constructed or context specific. However, **this does not mean that they are amenable to facile capture or representation through any single prism of analysis. Rather, considering bodily responses and reactions from the perspective of affect demands attention to the cyclical, dynamic and reactive character of all actions/reactions. It is the differential bio-cultural production of certain war-bodies** with which Protevi is concerned, **which means that it is not enough for us to say that war is an eternal human experience because of the highly variable ways in which ‘war’ is experienced and conceived in different cultures**. He gives the example of music, which may create certain possibilities for group activity, and prime certain affective responses resulting in variable iterations of ‘war.’ In this sense, music is immediately physiological, social, cultural and military, in an emergent assemblage of bodies and populations. Brad Evans analyses the post-9/11 security landscape through the prism of Foucauldian biopolitics in order to outline the ways in which **the referent object of security is changing**, and to catalyse an exploration of the consequences of this for political possibility and resistance. **We can see security becoming decreasingly concerned with identity and increasingly focused on circulation and emergence.** In this sense**, it is no longer what things are that is the focus of the martial sciences, but what they are becomin**g . This produces a re-evaluation of the very meaning of ‘security’, and of its meaning for politics and the place of war in contemporary society. Moreover, **it is productive of a change in the object of security, which is no longer a defined group or state, but life itself; life understood as always being in the process of change and emergence**. Indeed, it **this ongoing process of becoming** which **defines ‘life’ as such. Life is becoming. It therefore cannot be secured through being fixed, rather, its becomings must be monitored and, if necessary, terminated before danger can be said to have emerged**. As Evans indicates, **this creates serious challenges for political thought**. **Firstly, ‘freedom’ becomes internalised within the system of security and governance, so that we can no longer think of freedom from security, but of security as the production of freedom. Secondly, the consequences of ‘freedom’ become radically unpredictable. The new sciences of complexity tell us that we cannot contain this radical freedom within a certain political territory or ideology: rather, the consequences of freedom are inherently unpredictable and unstable**. This is nowhere better illustrated than by the events of 9/11, when the potential of a ‘catastrophic individual’ to bring destruction and to transform perceptions of the security situation was brought into painfully sharp relief. What this means is that **the event**, in Deleuzian terms, **becomes the object of security, thereby creating a paradox in which the moment of political possibility is also the moment for the concentration of an arsenal of military-strategic forces which are actually productive of the terrifying sorts of event which they would seek to foreclose**. Evans suggests that resources from Deleuze’s thought may **allow us to think through binaries such as present/future, finite/infinite, known/unknown, which litter the terrain of discourses of security/freedom, through the concept of difference which may mobilise an openness to political formation which enables us to think a future beyond security, danger and pre-emption**. Guillaume Sibertin-Blanc offers an analysis of Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of the war machine which is concerned with the way it can produce a theory of war in which the repressive powers of the state are not localised in the army, the police forces and so on, but comes to be constituted in certain ways through the dynamic interaction of forces which either affirm the state or flee from it. In this respect, a genealogy of war involves tracing the processes by which the war machine comes to be captured by the state, as well as being attentive to the lines of flight along which the war machine escapes capture and comes to constitute a force of resistance to state appropriation. Reading Deleuze and Guattari’s war machine together with Clausewitzian precepts concerning the status of war, what becomes apparent are the profound social and economic ramifications of this reading of war. For Clausewitz, war is the servant of state politics, and can be so precisely because it is not itself political. Similarly, for Deleuze and Guattari, the war machine is always potentially setting up a line of flight from state politics, and is not itself exhausted or determined by it. But Sibertin-Blanc argues that Clausewitz places too much emphasis on war as an institutionally governed historical reality, whereas Deleuze and Guattari are concerned with the identification of the concept of the war machine deterritorialised from its geo-political manifestations. The process by which the war machine is captured by the state is not itself military, because the military is the outcome of this process. Rather, it is territorial and relates to the circulation of men and things within the state. In the current system, **the state has lost control of the war machine, and thus the war machine no longer has war as its object, as this would have to be given by the state. Rather, it is through the political economy, and the interstices of society themselves, that the war machine operates, manifesting itself as a global security order rather than an exceptional moment of war**. **Although states of exception still present a challenge, the war machine becomes associated with the very fabric of normality as such which, no longer driven by the state, becomes disaggregated from politics: a technocracy of order which presents itself as being the very underlying conditions of life itself**. Sibertin-Blanc suggests that one could replace the political end given to the war machine with the economic end that it now has, in the sense that the war machine is concerned with the immanent unfolding of the capitalist economy itself. Further, he argues that **the idea of a war machine dedicated to a ‘global peace’ should not deceive us into expecting a degree of pacification or a decline in violence. Quite the contrary.** The point is rather that the **global violence and instability is itself internal to the world wide war machine and does not constitute an interruption in its rule**. Sibertin-Blanc **leaves us with the challenge of thinking a politics of resistance which can contend with the normalisation of war as a background condition for everyday life; a politics which, one cannot be think, may itself derive some sustenance from the resources of the war machine with which to construct its line of flight**. Gregg Lambert traces the exteriority of the war machine to the state, and the relationship this conjures between the state and ‘the people.’ He suggests that **the state is always in the process of seeking to capture the people, in ideology, in political philosophy or in a martial relation to those who defy the state’s insistence on interiority and regularity**. **While the left might seek to build its legitimacy on the morality of the people, this is an appropriation which actually serves to cauterise the revolutionary potential of the people** in Deleuze and Guattari’s thinking. The problem is that **‘the people’ may all too readily collapse into a fascist assemblage, the nomad may appear most prominently in the guise of an ambulant suicide bomber, and**, as Deleuze and Guattari **are themselves appropriated** by the IDF **for the contribution that they can make into the pacification of hostile striated space, it seems that there is no conceptual territory which is safe from the grasping hands of the militarists, or from the threat of a fatal territorialisation on the black hole of negation**. However, **the point is that the schizophrenic, bipolar nature of concepts** in Deleuze and Guattari **hauls us back from the brink of despair, because ‘the people’ may also appear as a war machine with respect to the state, producing the emergence of new political possibilities**. Lambert explores the figures used by Deleuze and Guattari to dramatise the elusive and contradictory nature of ‘the people.’ For example, Ahab and Bartleby both, in their different ways, defy the state and thereby somehow embody it. They betray it, and at the same time express what is most essential about it. In this sense, they produce the American dream through their refusal to conform to it. Through their failure in the eyes of the state, they produce a creative line of flight from it. Only by failing can they produce. These refusenik or defiant figures who populate Deleuze and Guattari’s texts are actually the poles of the revolutionary becomings of the people. **No one truly embodies the American dream, there is no perfect citizen, and there are no people. It is only through the rejection of, or escape from these injunctions that a ‘people to come’ can be summoned; a people who never arrives but stands for the permanent possibility of difference within a political system**. Lambert suggests that there are problems with the ineluctable bipolarity of Deleuze and Guattari’s war machine, however, not least that **we are left with the task of distinguishing between ‘destructive violence and creative violence.’ This is not a new problem, for is not the task of revolutionary violence the dedication of force to the redemption of the world?** The question is whether Deleuze and Guattari offer us **a novel way out of this conundrum**. Lambert **suggests that we concentrate our research on the idea of death, which may be the genocidal nadir to which the modern military arsenal dedicates itself, or which may be a space of pure becoming, ‘A Life’ , which represents the pure form of political possibility and therefore the counter to the black hole to which the war machine collapse**.

The state of pure war is an internalized dread which manifests itself in populations conditioned by the dramatization of catastrophic events. This is invisible, psychic, violence comes first because it occurs at the ontological level and makes material war and violence possible.

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Paul Virilio and Sylvere Lotringer’s concept of “pure war” refers to the potential of a culture to destroy itself completely (12).2We as psychoanalysts can—and increasingly must—explore the impact of this concept on our practice, and on the growing number of patients who live with the inability to repress or dissociate their experience and awareness of the pure war condition. The realization of a patient’s worst fears in actual catastrophic events has always been a profound enough psychotherapeutic challenge. These days, however, catastrophic events not only threaten friends, family, and neighbors; they also become the stuff of endless repetitions and dramatizations on radio, television, and Internet.3 Such continual reminders of death and destruction affect us all. What is the role of the analyst treating patients who live with an ever-threatening sense of the pure war lying just below the surface of our cultural veneer? At the end of the First World War, the first “total war,” Walter Benjamin observed that “nothing [after the war] remained unchanged but the clouds, and beneath these clouds, in a field of force of destructive torrents and explosions, was the tiny, fragile human body”(84). Julia Kristeva makes a similar note about our contemporary situation, “The recourse to atomic weapons seems to prove that horror...can rage absolutely” (232). And, as if he too were acknowledging this same fragility and uncontainability, the French politician Georges Clemenceau commented in the context of World War I that “war is too serious to be confined to the military” (qtd. in Virilio and Lotringer 15). Virilio and Lotringer gave the name “pure war” to the psychological condition that results when people know that they live in a world where the possibility for absolute destruction (e.g., nuclear holocaust) exists. As Virilio and Lotringer see it, it is not the technological capacity for destruction (that is, for example, the existence of nuclear armaments) that imposes the dread characteristic of a pure war psychology but the belief systems that this capacity sets up. Psychological survival requires that a way be found (at least unconsciously) to escape inevitable destruction—it requires a way out—but this enforces an irresolvable paradox, because the definition of pure war culture is that there is no escape. Once people believe in the external possibility— at least those people whose defenses cannot handle the weight of the dread that pure war imposes— pure war becomes an internal condition, a perpetual state of preparation for absolute destruction and for personal, social, and cultural death.

And, We are not saying that we should maintain an embargo on engagement with cuba, but that we should change the way that we conceptualize engagement from an institutional position.

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[David, Rick A. Matthews, Ohio University, William J. Miller, professor @ Carthage College, 2001, Critical Criminology, “Toward A Victimology of State Crime”, <http://jthomasniu.org/class/781/Assigs/kauzvictimology.pdf>, accessed 7-1-13, GSK]

Propositions about the victimology of state crime can be developed from this review to help shed light on the larger phenomenon of state crime victimization, although a caveat is in order because state crime takes a variety of forms. For instance, it is difﬁcult to compare the victimology of international economic terrorism against the people of Cuba and Iraq to institutionalized racism, sexism, and classism, or the suffering of human radiation subjects to unjust criminal justice system practices. Nevertheless, several general propositions about the victims of state crime may be formulated based on current and prior research in the area.¶ (1) Victims of State Crime Tend to be among the Least Socially Powerful Actors¶ Even a cursory examination of state crime reveals large power differences between the victim and victimizer. The authority of the state extends well beyond crude asymmetries in the ability to control others, and constitutional and due process protections also vary relative to the power of subjects.¶ State ofﬁcers, agencies, and organizations often exploit scarce resources to advance larger agendas through the use of specialized terminology, scientiﬁc knowledge, and information technology. Clearly the victims of the human radiation experiments, those harmed by environmental degradation, atomic and nuclear weapons tests, and the COINTELPRO, did not have the resources to marshal commensurate levels of technological, terminological, or scientiﬁc expertise. The state also has the ability to conceal illegalities and immoralities by privileging concerns about “national security” over humane, fair, and due processes. In the case of those victimized by criminal justice and the prison experiments, one senses a great deal of dehumanization and ideology, which allows unjust practices and policies to ﬂourish.¶ Victims of other state crimes – such as civilians in war, people targeted for genocide, workers, and the homeless – also have less social power than state agencies and ofﬁcials. Scapegoating, stereotyping, proﬁling, and typifying people belonging to these groups is far easier for the state because of broad asymmetries in power. It is therefore not surprising that galvanizing support for unethical and illegal practices and policies against these groups is not difﬁcult for the state. As a result, the likelihood of the legitimation of a crisis or substantial social protest movements is diminished. It also militates against conceptualizing unjust state actions as crime. One can see evidence of this process at work in the cases of economic and domestic terrorism and the support of terrorism abroad.¶ More broadly, there seems to be a positive relationship between the unequal distribution of power and the level and frequency of state crime, both domestically and internationally. Clearly, social power is unevenly distributed among states as well, providing further opportunities for state crime.¶ The United States has more control over the deﬁnition, enforcement, and prosecution of state crime than most countries. The World Court, the United Nations’ Security Council, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund are likely to support U.S. interests. With few exceptions, peripheral and semi-peripheral states are less likely to have any victimization by the U.S. acknowledged and redressed. There is a direct link between U.S. supported and enforced sanctions against Iraq and the death of innocent Iraqi children because of starvation. Sanctions against the Cuban people have also resulted in social and physical harms.¶ Authority-subject relationships (Turk 1969) in an international context help explain how these harms are marginalized in popular U.S. discourses:¶ The claims-making and legitimation exercises of the authority (the U.S. state) are seldom met with organized opposition by subjects. If there is a sizeable movement against U.S. policy and practice, citizens might either be unaware of its existence or may perceive opposition as the work of radicals disconnected with reality (Iraqi politicians, Castro, prisoners’ rights, welfare rights, and anti-nuclear weapons groups). Social harms and higher immoralities might therefore be overlooked, or even worse, supported because of the apparent lack of overt conﬂict over the policy or practice. This makes it appear as though the harms are actually necessary, fair, and consensus-based.¶ U.S. public support of the Gulf War is most illustrative of this point.¶ (2) Victimizers Generally Fail to Recognize and Understand the Nature, Extent, and Harmfulness of Institutional Policies. If Suffering and Harm are Acknowledged, It Is often Neutralized within the Context of a Sense of “Entitlement”¶ The most important difference between victimizers and their victims is the power to exert their will. Victimizers often do not acknowledge the degree to which their policies have caused harm while assessing the effectiveness of their policies to bring about desired change, maintain hegemony, or promote other forms of dominance. Unjust and deleterious domestic and international policies can also be downplayed by neutralizing reasonable categorical imperatives (e.g. do no harm) by employing bankrupt consequentialism, perhaps guided by ethnocentric paternalism. Following Sykes and Matza¶ (1957), others have found evidence of this at work in the wider problem of elite deviance. Denying responsibility, dehumanizing the powerless for purposes of exploitation, and appealing to higher loyalties (i.e. the capitalist political economy and national security) are often employed in the victimology of state crime. Specialized vocabularies may also be used to aide in the dehumanization.¶ Tifft and Markham (1991) have noted that the way policy makers neutralize the destructive and harmful effects of their policies is similar to the manner batterers view their victims. Noting the long history of U.S. abuses in¶ Latin and Central America, they argue that:¶ U.S. policy makers have consciously decided (1) that the U.S. is entitled to control Central America and that the peoples of Central America are obligated to acquiesce in this power exercise; (2) that violence is permissible, and policy makers can live with themselves and conclude that they are ethical/moral persons and that these policies are ethical/moral even if they involve violence; (3) that the use of violence, intimidation, and threat of violence will produce the desired effect or minimize a more negative one; and (4) that the policy of violence and control will not unduly endanger the United States, and the country will neither sustain physical harm nor suffer legal, economic, or political consequences that will outweigh the beneﬁts achieved through this violence (Tifft and Markham¶ 1991: 125–126).¶ Similarly, Cohen (1996) has documented how governments construct ofﬁ-cial responses to allegations of human rights violations. Cohen (1996: 522) contends that the forms of denial on the part of governmental ofﬁcials to such allegations typically include one of the following: “a literal denial (nothing happened); interpretive denial (what happened is really something else); and implicatory denial (what happened is justiﬁed).” ¶ At the domestic level, few policy makers have recognized that the cumulative effects of the policies supportive of institutionalized racism and structural inequality have caused considerable harm to various minority groups and women. Often times, the victims are viewed as undeserving or unworthy of the social, political, or economic rights bestowed to others.¶ (3) Victims of State Crime are often Blamed for Their Suffering¶ Victim blaming is unfortunately a common reaction to those most wounded by state crime. The poor, minorities, the homeless, and women become targets of criticism because of the false belief in the ease of achieving vertical intergenerational mobility in the U.S., even in the face of overwhelming structural odds. Prisoners and those accused of crimes are less likely to be treated sympathetically because their assigned master status solipsistically leads to a marginalization of their human worth, morality, and potential. Subjects in the prisoner experiments were viewed as less deserving of informed consent at best and expendable at worst.¶ Harms caused by economic terrorism and the support of anti-democratic governments can be neutralized by popular audiences (and victimizers) as a part of the United States’ interests in national security or the previously mentioned technique of neutralization, “appealing to higher loyalties.” The harms caused by sanctions in Cuba and Iraq are good examples because, while they are easy to see, there is a tendency to assume victim responsibility on the part of citizens because they have not waged successful civil insurrections against their oppressors.¶ (4) Victims of State Crime Must Generally Rely on the Victimizer, an Associated Institution, or Civil Social Movements for Redress¶ Theoretically, the U.S. criminal justice system carries out the criminalization process in the name of the state, not the particular victim. The “people” are identiﬁed as the abstracted victim. What happens, however, when “the people” or a group of peoples are victimized by the body who holds dominion over them and the law? What institutionalized justice process is available to the victim?¶ Often times, as in the case of the prisoner and plutonium experiments, and some instances of racial and gender discrimination, reparations may come about in civil court, and often involve the efforts of special interest groups, people in social movements, and of course private attorneys. In other cases, appeal may be made to the United Nations Human Rights Committee, through the United Nations General Assembly, or the International Court of Justice. The opportunities for international redress of domestic victimi-zation, to some extent, depend on the primary state’s membership status.¶ For example, the United States did not ratify the Genocide Convention for decades because it sought to limit “foreign intrusion” into what were deﬁned as domestic affairs. Citizens victimized in countries with tenuous or marginal standing in the international community as it pertains to human rights may therefore ﬁnd little in the way of assistance.¶ The most potentially dangerous act that could ever by undertaken by a state, the use of nuclear weapons, has recently been criminalized through this latter avenue. Six billion people still live under the nuclear threat, but at least one organization of legitimate authority, the World Court, has conceptualized the entire world population as potential victims of state crime by declaring the use and threat to use nuclear weapons illegal under international law (see Kramer and Kauzlarich 1999). More often than not, however, international organizations like the U.N. have been slow to enforce existing laws or to punish nation-states that are powerful. For example, each year, the U.N. General Assembly has voted to condemn the U.S. embargo on Cuba, but no ofﬁcial action has been taken by the U.N. to end it. In short, there is little hope of formal intervention on the part of the international community when the offending state is powerful like the U.S. On another level, U.S. opposition to international agreements because of the state’s fear of the loss of sovereignty (no matter how slight) also thwart the materializing of democratic and restorative justice.¶ In any case, the process of helping victims or even ending the victimization of state crime is very different than in cases of traditional or white-collar crime. This stems from problems related to the identiﬁcation of the actors, organizations, and institutional forces responsible for state crime, if the policy, actions, or omissions are even recognized as unethical, harmful, criminal, or worthy of resistance.¶ (5) Victims of State Crime Are Easy Targets for Repeated Victimization¶ The manner in which victims of state crime are harmed may change over time; however, the harm incurred by most victims of state crime does not decrease – rather it merely takes another form. Additionally, some victims are continually victimized by the same organization. Examples include women, minorities, the poor, workers, and those living in less developed countries, in much the same manner as some victims of traditional street crime (e.g., domestic violence and child abuse) who are targeted for repeat victimization.¶ In the cases of the poor, there have been few genuine attempts to alleviate the structural conditions that create abject poverty (Bohm 1993). Women have faced institutional sexism and the “glass ceiling” in spite of superﬁcial efforts designed to give them equal status in society. Minorities have long been the targets of overt and institutionalized racism. While some have argued that afﬁrmative action policies have eliminated the effects of racism, institutionalized racism persists in spite of the progress which has been made. Native Americans have been repeatedly victimized throughout U.S. history, and remain one of the most repressed minority groups in our society (Churchill¶ 1995).¶ Another example is the repeated victimization of the plutonium subjects and their families, who continued to be treated unethically by state agencies for decades. Several years after the deaths of many of the plutonium subjects, the families were sent a letter from the Atomic Energy Commission, which exhumed the bodies for additional research:¶ The purpose of the exhumation was to examine the remains in order to determine ...residual radioactivity from past medical treatment, and that the subjects had an unknown mixture of radioactive isotopes (Advisory Committee on Human. Radiation Experiments 1995: 260).¶ Two willful lies are told in this memo: (1) that the subjects were treated, and (2) that they had received an unknown quantity of radiation. The truth is this: (a) the subjects were guinea pigs not expected to react favorably to the injections, and (b) internal records clearly showed how much plutonium had been injected into their veins (Kauzlarich and Kramer 1998). Rowland provides further evidence of higher immorality when he wrote to his colleagues about the exhumation project:¶ Please note that outside the Center ... we will never use the word plutonium in regard to these cases. “These individuals are of interest to us because they may have received a radioactive material at some time is the kind of statement to be made, if we need to say anything at all” (Markey¶ Report 1986: 27).¶ (6) Illegal State Policies and Practices, while Committed by Individuals and Groups of Individuals, Are Manifestations of the Attempt to Achieve Organizational, Bureaucratic, or Institutional Goals¶ A recurrent theme has been that the harms caused by the state are due to the actions of individuals or groups of individuals who are pursuing the larger goals of their respective organizations. These larger institutional goals may or may not be consistent with the goals of particular individuals. Rather than viewing the harm to the victims of state crime as the result of a few people engaging in immoral, unethical, and/or illegal behavior, it is more instructive to conceptualize state crime as the product of organizational pressures to achieve organizational goals. Many forms of state crime persist for long periods of time (e.g., Iran-Contra, the economic embargo against Cuba, institutionalized discrimination in the criminal justice system), and are carried out by many different actors. If the unethical, immoral, and/or illegal behavior in question were the result of a handful of people, then one would presume that either the activities would desist once those people left the organization or that there would be other people waiting to ﬁll those roles.¶ Since many state crimes persist over time with different people ﬁlling various roles, one can only presume that either there are a lot of immoral people who come into positions of power to carry out the immoral or unethical behavior, or that there is something about the organizational culture itself which fosters such immorality. In the best case, the organization itself has a problem screening out immoral/unethical decision-makers. In the worst case, the organizational climate itself fosters, facilitates, or encourages such behavior (e.g., see Braithwaite 1989: Ermann and Lundman 1996).¶ Also, to reduce state crimes to the individual level is to ignore the social, political, and historical contexts which shape the nature, form, and goals of state agencies. Even a cursory examination of the various forms of state crime reveals that these larger contexts are macrologically linked to state crime victimization and offending. Sometimes these contexts are exigent, such as when cold war hysteria provided motivation for illegal and unethical human radiation experiments, weapons testing, and environmental degradation. Other times, the crimes may be politically and geographically contextualized (i.e., Cuba’s proximity to the U.S.). The state, therefore, may be instrumental in creating and sustaining the conditions that account for the persistence of institutional harms caused by its agencies.

Thus the plan: The United States federal government should normalize trade relations toward cuba for no reason.

Contention Two is Desire

Smooth talk and good intentions with singular policy prescriptions miss the point, the conception that we are the USFG with a collective utilitarian agenda started the problem, instead of asking how should we engage cuba, we should ask why we desire to engage cuba

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(Ladelle, “Guilt as Management Technology: A Call to Heideggerian Reflection” Heidegger and the Earth, pg. 7-9)

Those configurations of forces will resist this thinking. Their resistance will occur in many forms. However, one of the most common ways that modern calculative selfhood will attempt to reinstate itself in the face of Heidegger’s paradoxical call to think the earth is by employing a strategy that has worked so well so many times before: it will feel guilty. Those of us who are white know this strategy very well. Confronted with our racism, we respond not by working to dismantle the structures that perpetuate racism but rather by feeling guilty. Our energy goes into self-rebuke, and the problems pointed out to us become so painful for us to contemplate that we keep our distance from them. Through guilt we paralyze ourselves. Thus guilt is a marvelous strategy for maintaining the white racist self. Those of us who are women have sometimes watched this strategy employed by the caring, liberal-minded men in our lives. When we have exposed sexism, pressed our criticisms and our claims, we have seen such men — the ‘good’ men, by far the most responsive men — deflate, apologize, and ask us to forgive. But seldom have we seen honest attempts at change. Instead we have seen guilt deployed as a cry for mercy or pity on the status quo; and when pity is not forthcoming we have seen guilt turn to rage, and we have heard men ask, “Why are you punishing us?” The primary issue then becomes the need to attend to the feelings of those criticized rather than to their oppressive institutions and behaviors. Guilt thus protects the guilty. Guilt is a facet of power; it is not a reordering of power or a signal of oppression’s end. Guilt is one of the modern managerial self’s maneuvers of self-defense. Of course guilt does not feel that way. It feels like something unchosen, something we undergo. It feels much more like self-abuse than self-defense. But we are shaped, informed, produced in our very selves by the same forces of history that have created calculative, technological revealing. Inevitably, whenever we are confronted with the unacceptability of what is foundational for our lives, those foundations exert force to protect themselves. The exertion, which occurs as and in the midst of very real pain, is not a conscious choice; but that does not lessen — in fact it strengthens — its power as a strategy of self-defense. Calculative, technological thinking struggles to defend and maintain itself through us and as us. Some men feel guilty about sexism; many white people feel guilty shout racism; most of us feel guilty about all sorts of habits and idiosyncracies that we tell ourselves we firmly believe should be changed. For many of us guilt is a constant constraint upon our lives, a seemingly permanent state. As a result, guilt is familiar, and, though somewhat uncomfortable at times, it comes to feel almost safe. It is no surprise, then, that whenever caring people think hard about how to live with/in/on the earth, we find ourselves growing anxious and, usually, feeling guilty about the way we conduct ourselves in relation to the natural world. Guilt is a standard defense against the call for change as it takes root within us. But, if we are to think with Heidegger, if we are to heed his call to reflect, we must not respond to it simply by deploring our decadent life-styles and indulging ourselves in a fit of remorse. Heidegger’s call is not a moral condemnation, nor is it a call to take up some politically correct position or some privileged ethical stance. When we respond to Heidegger’s call as if it were a moral condemnation, we reinstate a discourse in which active agency and its projects and responsibilities take precedence over any other way of being with the earth. In other words, we insist on remaining within the discourses, the power configurations, of the modern managerial self. Guilt is a concept whose heritage and meaning occur within the ethical tradition of the Western world. But the history of ethical theory in the West (and it could be argued that ethical theory only occurs in the West) is one with the history of technological thought. The revelation of things as to-be-managed and the imperative to be in control work themselves out in the history of ethics just as surely as they work themselves out in the history of the natural and human sciences. It is probably quite true that in many different cultures, times, and places human beings have asked the question: How shall I best live my life? But in the West, and in relatively modern times, we have reformulated that question so as to ask: How shall I conduct myself? How shall I behave? How shall I manage my actions, my relationships, my desires? And how shall I make sure my neighbors do the same? Alongside technologies of the earth have grown up technologies of the soul, theories of human behavioral control of which current ethical theories are a significant subset. Ethics in the modern world at least very frequently functions as just another field of scientific study yielding just another set of engineering goals. Therefore, when we react to problems like ecological crises by retreating into the familiar discomfort of our Western sense of guilt, we are not placing ourselves in opposition to technological thinking and its ugly consequences. On the contrary, we are simply reasserting our technological dream of perfect managerial control. How so? Our guilt professes our enduring faith in the managerial dream by insisting that problems — problems like oil spills, acid rain, groundwater pollution, the extinction of whales, the destruction of the ozone, the rain forests, the wetlands — lie simply in mismanagement or in a failure to manage (to manage ourselves in this case) and by reaffirming to ourselves that if we had used our power to manage our behavior better in the first place we could have avoided this mess. In other words, when we respond to Heidegger’s call by indulging in feelings of guilt about how we have been treating the object earth, we are really just telling ourselves how truly powerful we, as agents, are. We are telling ourselves that we really could have done differently; we had the power to make things work, if only we had stuck closer to the principles of good management. And in so saying we are in yet a new and more stubborn way refusing to hear the real message, the message that human beings are not, never have been, and never can be in complete control, that the dream of that sort of managerial omnipotence is itself the very danger of which Heidegger warns. Thus guilt — as affirmation of human agential power over against passive matter — is just another way of covering over the mystery. Thus guilt is just another way of refusing to face the fact that we human beings are finite and that we must begin to live with the earth instead of trying to maintain total control. Guilt is part and parcel of a managerial approach to the world. Thinking along Heidegger’s paths means resisting the power of guilt, resisting the desire to close ourselves off from the possibility of being with our own finitude. It means finding “the courage to make the truth of our own presuppositions and the realm of our own goals into the things that most deserve to be called in question.” It means holding ourselves resolutely open for the shattering power of the event of thinking, even if what is shattered eventually is ourselves.

Put away your cheating counterplans – the ontology of engagement is the standard for desirability in this round because it frames how we understand the benefits of our policies, their objection that we cannot theorize now because people will die masks the necessity of theorizing so that our actions can go in the right direction – our aff is a pre-requisite for an ethical politics towards non-violence

Burke ‘7

(Anthony, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, Sydney, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason”, Theory and Event, 10.2, Muse)

My argument here, whilst normatively sympathetic to Kant's moral demand for the eventual abolition of war, militates against excessive optimism.86 Even as I am arguing that war is not an enduring historical or anthropological feature, or a neutral and rational instrument of policy -- that it is rather the product of hegemonic forms of knowledge about political action and community -- my analysis does suggest some sobering conclusions about its power as an idea and formation. Neither the progressive flow of history nor the pacific tendencies of an international society of republican states will save us. The violent ontologies I have described here in fact dominate the conceptual and policy frameworks of modern republican states and have come, against everything Kant hoped for, to stand in for progress, modernity and reason. Indeed what Heidegger argues, I think with some credibility, is that the enframing world view has come to stand in for being itself. Enframing, argues Heidegger, 'does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is...it drives out every other possibility of revealing...the rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.'87 What I take from Heidegger's argument -- one that I have sought to extend by analysing the militaristic power of modern ontologies of political existence and security -- is a view that the challenge is posed not merely by a few varieties of weapon, government, technology or policy, but by an overarching system of thinking and understanding that lays claim to our entire space of truth and existence. Many of the most destructive features of contemporary modernity -- militarism, repression, coercive diplomacy, covert intervention, geopolitics, economic exploitation and ecological destruction -- derive not merely from particular choices by policymakers based on their particular interests, but from calculative, 'empirical' discourses of scientific and political truth rooted in powerful enlightenment images of being. Confined within such an epistemological and cultural universe, policymakers' choices become necessities, their actions become inevitabilities, and humans suffer and die. Viewed in this light, 'rationality' is the name we give the chain of reasoning which builds one structure of truth on another until a course of action, however violent or dangerous, becomes preordained through that reasoning's very operation and existence. It creates both discursive constraints -- available choices may simply not be seen as credible or legitimate -- and material constraints that derive from the mutually reinforcing cascade of discourses and events which then preordain militarism and violence as necessary policy responses , however ineffective, dysfunctional or chaotic. The force of my own and Heidegger's analysis does, admittedly, tend towards a deterministic fatalism. On my part this is quite deliberate; it is important to allow this possible conclusion to weigh on us. Large sections of modern societies -- especially parts of the media, political leaderships and national security institutions -- are utterly trapped within the Clausewitzian paradigm, within the instrumental utilitarianism of 'enframing' and the stark ontology of the friend and enemy. They are certainly tremendously aggressive and energetic in continually stating and reinstating its force. But is there a way out? Is there no possibility of agency and choice? Is this not the key normative problem I raised at the outset, of how the modern ontologies of war efface agency, causality and responsibility from decision making; the responsibility that comes with having choices and making decisions, with exercising power? (In this I am much closer to Connolly than Foucault, in Connolly's insistence that, even in the face of the anonymous power of discourse to produce and limit subjects, selves remain capable of agency and thus incur responsibilities.88) There seems no point in following Heidegger in seeking a more 'primal truth' of being -- that is to reinstate ontology and obscure its worldly manifestations and consequences from critique. However we can, while refusing Heidegger's unworldly89 nostalgia, appreciate that he was searching for a way out of the modern system of calculation; that he was searching for a 'questioning', 'free relationship' to technology that would not be immediately recaptured by the strategic, calculating vision of enframing. Yet his path out is somewhat chimerical -- his faith in 'art' and the older Greek attitudes of 'responsibility and indebtedness' offer us valuable clues to the kind of sensibility needed, but little more. When we consider the problem of policy, the force of this analysis suggests that choice and agency can be all too often limited; they can remain confined (sometimes quite wilfully) within the overarching strategic and security paradigms. Or, more hopefully, policy choices could aim to bring into being a more enduringly inclusive, cosmopolitan and peaceful logic of the political. But this cannot be done without seizing alternatives from outside the space of enframing and utilitarian strategic thought, by being aware of its presence and weight and activating a very different concept of existence, security and action.90 This would seem to hinge upon 'questioning' as such -- on the questions we put to the real and our efforts to create and act into it. Do security and strategic policies seek to exploit and direct humans as material, as energy, or do they seek to protect and enlarge human dignity and autonomy? Do they seek to impose by force an unjust status quo (as in Palestine), or to remove one injustice only to replace it with others (the U.S. in Iraq or Afghanistan), or do so at an unacceptable human, economic, and environmental price? Do we see our actions within an instrumental, amoral framework (of 'interests') and a linear chain of causes and effects (the idea of force), or do we see them as folding into a complex interplay of languages, norms, events and consequences which are less predictable and controllable?91 And most fundamentally: Are we seeking to coerce or persuade? Are less violent and more sustainable choices available? Will our actions perpetuate or help to end the global rule of insecurity and violence? Will our thought?

**Prediction is impossible – linear analysis causes policy failure**

**Sa, 4** – Deug Whan, Dong-U College, South Korea, (“CHAOS, UNCERTA I N T Y, AND POLICY CHOICE: UTILIZING THE ADAPTIVE MODEL,” International Review of Public Administration, vol. 8, no. 2, 2004, scholar)RK

In many cases, a small choice might lead to overwhelming results that generate either a virtuous cycle or a vicious cycle. If future results can be clearly predicted by stability and linearity, this will eliminate difficulties in making choice. Policy choice has been an embarrassment in uncertain or chaotic situations that do not meet desirable conditions. As a result, most major policies revert back to the uncertainty and chaos. Though the presence of uncertainty in policy procedures is widely known, it has not been determined what influence it wields on policy choice (Morgan and Henruion 1990: Lein 1997: 20). Generally, uncertainty refers to ‘difficulties in predicting the future.’ Naturally, the uncertainty here includes not simply difficulties in predicting the results of various factors and interactions, but also difficulties in predicting different configurations of interactions caused by the effect of such interactions (Saperstein 1997: 103-107). Uncertainty is classified into 3 categories according to source and phase of policy procedures; i) uncertainty from contingency, ii) uncertainty from inter-dependency of constituents, and iii) general uncertainty (Tompson 1967). The uncertainty from contingency arises when it is impossible to predict how the policy environment will change. What results is uncertainty from the interdependency of constituents makes it impossible to predict changes in the relationship between policy matters and constituents. Finally, general uncertainty comes from lack of knowledge about the cause and effect relationship in policy making. The Emergence of Chaos Theory and Characteristics Chaos theory offers theoretical explanations about the world of uncertainty. Chaos theory refers to the study of complex and dynamic systems with orders and patterns emerging from externally chaotic forms (Prigogine and Strengers 1984). The reason chaos theory draws a lot of interest is the highlight of; disorder, instability, diversity, flexibility and disequilibrium. This explains characteristics of rapid social changes in modern times referred to as the age of uncertainty. The focus of the chaos theory as a study is on complex, indeterminate, non-linear and dynamic systems. The main study object chaotic systems are chaotic which are complicated and dynamic. The characteristics of the chaos theory are as follows: The first is its self-organization principle. Selforganization means that the organization is determined by internal factors without any outer interference. That is to say, self-organization is a network of production processes of constituents interrelated with each other, and a system that produces the same network (Varela Maturana and Urife 1974; Jantsch 1980). The chaos theory assumes that order and organization can make an autogenesis out of disorder and chaos through the process of ‘self-organization.’ This also means that setting up conditions for self-organization to naturally take place can result in a reduction of policy failures. The second characteristic is co-evolution, referring to a process in which individual entities constituting a system continually adapt to each other and change. The essential concept of co-evolution, is ‘mutual causality,’ which puts emphasis on mutual evolution where an individual entity evolves entire group and vice versa, not the evolution of the survival of the fittest. It means interdependent species in continual inter-relationships evolve together. For example, if a mutant frog appears with a longer tongue or a frog whose hunting speed is twice as fast, it will have a competitive advantage to the environment and subsequent off-spring will flourish with the superior gene. On the other hand, flies will decrease in number, until a mutant fly appears that has any combination of advantages such as; faster, bad smells frogs avoid, or becomes poisonous, subsequent off-spring will survive and flourish. This is the way frogs and flies coevolve with each other. Therefore, chaos theory regards a variety of paradoxes as an important principle instead of ignoring it or taking it as an exception. Third, the characteristic is the existing Newtonian determinism theory which presumes linear relations where things proceed from the starting point toward the future on the thread of a single orbit. Thus, it also assumes that predictions of the future are on the extended line of present knowledge and future knowledge is not as unclear as the present one (Saperstein 1997: 103107), and that as similar inputs generate similar outcomes, there will be no big differences despite small changes in initial conditions. However, chaos theory assumes that the outcome is larger than the input and that prediction of the future is fundamentally impossible.3 Hence, due to extreme sensitivity to initial fluctuations and non-linear feedback loops, small differences in initial conditions are subject to amplifications and eventual different outcomes, known as ‘chaos.’4 Chaos is sometimes divided into strong chaos and weak chaos (Eve, Horsfall and Lee 1997: 106); and goes through a series of orbit processes of close intersections and divisions. In particular, weak chaos is found in the limits that account for the small proportion inside a system, while strong chaos features divisions at some points inside a system, which lead to occupation of the entire system in little time. CHAOS, UNCERTAINTY AND POLICY CHOICE 1. Review of Existing Policy Models Social scientists have tried to explain and predict policy matters, but never have generated satisfactory outcomes in terms of accuracy of predictions. There could be a variety of reasons for this inaccuracy in prediction, but one certain reason is that policies themselves are intrinsically governed by uncertainty, complexity and chaos in policies that produce many different outcomes though they are faced with the same initial internal states, the same environments, and governed by the same causal relationships.

Rationalization of cuba’s politics is an impossibility – the attempt to try to know or prescribe response to policies comes from the hegemonic mode of politics that the 1ac impact turns

Fernández, 2k

(Damián J., Head of the Ethical Culture Fieldston School and PhD in International Relations @ University of Miami, *Cuba and the Politics of Passion*, University of Texas Press, Pg. vi-xv)

This book does not begin with this sentence. It started years ago, in 1979, when as a senior at Princeton I walked the streets of Havana during a weeklong visit. It was the first time I had been in Cuba since my family and I left in 1963. The experience was emotional and revealing; revealing perhaps because it was emotional. The Cuba I felt did not match the Cuba I had studied in class and read about in books. Something was missing in the political science texts on the topic. This book, two decades later, is an attempt to explain to myself and others what that was. After years of study and several other visits to the island, I identified what was missing as lo informal (the informal). **The literature on Cuba presented a political system and a social system detached from each other and far more formal** than what I encountered during my trips. **Far from being a characteristic exclusive to one or another set of scholars, formalism was pervasive in a field of study otherwise marked by pronounced cleavages**. With time I have come to recognize that **the bias toward formality runs deep in the intellectual history of modernity; it is not confined to the study of Cuba**. **Like the bulk of political science scholarship, the literature on Cuban politics has focused primarily on national and international structures and formal institutions. Even when scholars have emphasized** (or overemphasized) **the role of leadership, lo informal has not been considered. Informal social practices, the interactions among individuals in everyday life, and their political import have been neglected or rendered invisible. The resulting portrait of what constitutes the social and, by implication, the political has been rigid, inhuman, and much more ‘‘rational institutional’’ than what is true in the day-to-day experience of Cubans. In the standard academic perspective the Cuban people have appeared as either agents or objects of politics, confined to the categories ‘‘masses’’ or ‘‘classes,’’ but not as feeling beings with affective social networks that thrive in the non-state-regulated sphere. The emotional impact of politics and the relevance of emotions for politics have been absent as analytical categories**. Even personal testimonies, so much a part of the revolutionary literary experience—for instance, Oscar Lewis’s famous Four Lives: Living the Revolution— do not tell the story fully, as the emotional is not made explicitly political. Given the emotional outpouring the revolution of 1959 elicited, and continues to elicit inside and outside the island, even among academics**, the absence of the politics of informality and the politics of emotions is nothing short of remarkable**. My concern with social informality and its impact on state-society relations led me to pose a number of questions regarding the feelings and norms expressed in that arena of daily life. What are the codes of the informal? What are the sources of its political culture? What constitutes its hardware, its networks? What impact do informality and the emotional have on formal politics? How do formality and informality intersect? What do they reveal about the limits of state power vis-à-vis the society? What light do **the informal and the politics of emotions** shed on human action? These queries forced me to consider the sociopolitical role of emotions in the Cuban case. Intuitively I had felt this was important, yet it had **remained unspoken as scholars pursued ‘‘objective’’ analysis. Speaking about the emotional was a bit suspect, ‘‘soft,’’ ‘‘flaky,’’ passé, marginal at best. From the contemporary hegemonic political science paradigm of power and interest, emotions are a nontopic**. As I am of Cuban origin my interest in the affective was seen as especially questionable by the standards of a discipline that asks us not to get too close to the emotional and, most of all, not to become involved with our subject matter, perhaps valuable advice if one were a therapist. **From the dominant perspective ‘‘others’’—racially, intellectually, physically, sexually, and morally ‘‘inferior’’—rely on emotions rather than on reason. But a passionless discipline cannot make sense of the passions that compel individuals to act politically the world over, from Algeria to Zimbabwe, from Argentina to Yugoslavia. In the United States and in Europe issues such as immigration, civil rights, abortion, ethnicity, and national identity inflame passions. In the Cuban case the political passion exhibited by Cubans and non-Cubans regarding revolutionary politics rivals only human passion for passion. Yet passion has remained outside the parameters of political science**, at least in modern scholarship. After realizing the importance of the sociopolitics of emotions, I set out to find why there was such silence on the issue in political science. This book is the product of what I found in the process, a process that was much more inductive than deductive. What I (re)discovered in **a multidisciplinary literature** (from the founding fathers of liberalism to recent works by Mansbridge, Lutz, Solomon, Frank, Fukuyama, and Holmes, among others) **challenges the reductionist perspective of rational choice theory. The (re)discovery warranted a fresh**, if not entirely new, **approach to the study of politics: one in which emotions would be reconsidered and reincorporated; one that would not subsume all human action under a narrow rubric of self-interest; one that would not divorce the emotional from the rational or the affective and subjective from the instrumental and institutional; one that would bring together the nonmaterial (including the affective) and the material; one that would be affectively embedded, placing the individual with his or her affective networks in the broader institutional, cultural, and economic context**. This book proposes such an approach. **It attempts to bring the emotions back in, or better still, to bring them out—for they have been there, hidden and unrecognized—while not discarding rational choice or falling into the classical dichotomy of reason versus passion**. I present a way to reincorporate the emotions into the study of social politics based on the ‘‘new romanticism’’ in philosophy and social constructivism in anthropology. **Reason and emotion are understood as mutually reinforcing, culturally intertwined, and significant for the social and, therefore, for the political world. The approach seeks to bridge the divide between assumptions of individualism and institutionalism by attending to connections of affective and cultural embeddedness**. Cuba and the Politics of Passion tells two main stories. The first is the hitherto untold story of the role **emotions play in politics**, a story that has a modern and a late modern subtext. It is the story of social politics with emotions considered, particularly what I call the politics of passion and the politics of affection. Through this narrative I attempt to contribute to a revisionist interpretation of politics generally and of Cuban politics specifically by incorporating the fundamental, but not exclusive, role that affection and passion play in the political, a theme that since modern times has all but disappeared from the discipline. The book offers a dimension complementary to other approaches, not a substitute for them. **It does not argue that material and other nonmaterial factors do not matter**, nor does it argue that emotions play the primary role in political developments in Cuba or anywhere else. **Quite the opposite: structural, geographic, institutional, personal, historical, and international variables are indispensable for political explanations. My interest is to rescue a lost story and retell it through the Cuban case, in so doing broadening our understanding of the political**. **My approach is a political-cultural one—with an emphasis on the affective—that intersects with state-society relations**. It is informed by a variety of other approaches and disciplines, ranging from feminism to sociology, from anthropology to philosophy. I hope to contribute to the appreciation of the politics of emotions and informality and their impact on sociopolitical change and stability. **The rediscovery of the politics of emotions in the Cuban case will shed light on several other topics, namely, social revolutions, charismatic authority, informality, and civil society, as well as on current debates regarding modern assumptions about politics and society**. The second story this book tells takes place over time in a specific locale —Cuba in the twentieth century. This is the Cuban political story with emotions considered. I write about Cuba for a variety of reasons. First and foremost, because it interests me in very personal ways and because I have studied it longer than any other country. Second, **it was through the Cuban case— Cuba on the ground—that I found lo informal and the politics of emotions**. The Cuba I encountered in 1979 and the one I have come to know in the diaspora led me to pose the theoretical questions the book attempts to answer. **The political culture of Cuba provides fertile ground for an analysis with emotions brought in. The island’s history allows us to compare the sociopolitics of passion and affection under** two political regimes—**a capitalist democracy** (1902–1959) **and socialism** (1959 to the present)—**and during the revolutionary struggle that culminated in 1959. Democracy, socialism, and revolution require similar, yet distinct, emotional infrastructures. By comparing them, we can reach conclusions as to the continuity and discontinuity of the politics of passion and affection, the modalities they assume, their impact on different political systems, and how they, in turn, are affected by political and economic structures**. This is not an especially happy story, for it is a tale of a people who have aspired to political modernity in terms of sovereignty, nationhood, statehood, and democracy (in both its liberal and socialist variants) and who continue to dream of a better tomorrow despite the disappointment their aspirations have met in the past. **Reality in Cuba**, as in most other places, **has not matched the lofty normative expectations of modern constructs.** As I argue here, **the politics of affection and passion challenge our understanding of what is and is not modern**. The two story lines—that of **the politics of emotions and that of Cuban politics with passion and affection considered**—are interwoven, **form**ing **an account of how the modern paradigm is an incomplete perspective through which to understand and feel politics**